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Abstract 
This paper analytically addresses the question, to which degree the market power of OPEC is 
the key reason for the world market price of crude oil to exceed marginal extraction costs. 
Describing the various determinants of both extraction costs and the oil price constitutes the 
basis for an in-depth discussion on the relative impact of these variables. We argue that 
despite OPEC’s significant market power, other forces such as steadily increasing global 
demand, temporary supply constraints, or a growing importance of resource pragmatism and 
nationalism play a much greater role than OPEC’s market power. 
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1  Introduction 
The Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an intergovernmental group of 12 
member states which was founded in Baghdad in 1960. Currently providing on average 35% 
of global oil production (OPEC, 2014) and owning 75% of proven global oil reserves 
(USEIA, 2014) allows the group to exert significant market power. But to which degree can 
OPEC translate its dominance into direct influence on the oil price and, more specifically, 
whether its market power is the key reason for the oil price to exceed marginal extraction 
costs in the long-run? In the following, the paper analyses the extraction costs of oil. Then, the 
various geological, economic, political, and financial factors influencing the oil price are 
examined. The final conclusion will provide a critical discussion of the linkage between the 
oil price, extraction costs, and OPEC. 
2  Determinants and measurement of extraction costs of oil 
The standard model for the optimal exploitation of a non-renewable resource has its roots in 
the seminal paper by Hotelling (1931) in which a relationship between the social discount rate 
and net resource rent over time is presented. The so called Hotelling rule states that only if 
both terms are equal, i.e. the present value of discounted net benefits is the same in each 
period, an optimal extraction path is derived from which no incentives to deviate exist 
(Grafton et al., 2004). Based on this important insight the standard model of resource 
exploitation specifies reserve size and technical change as the major determinants of unit 
extraction cost. Grafton et al., (2004) integrate these two terms in the following standard 
extraction cost function (x – rate of extraction, b – stock size, t – time): 
c(x,b;t)  with cx(x,b;t)>0,   cxx(x,b;t)>0,   cxt(x,b;t)<0,   cxb(x,b;t)<0 
The necessary criterion is that the unit cost are positive (cx(x,b;t)>0), though increasing with 
greater amounts of extraction (cxx(x,b;t)>0). Further, an inverse relationship is assumed 
between the unit cost and both time (cxt(x,b;t)<0), as a result of technological progress, and 
the resource stock (cxb(x,b;t)<0). 
In the case of oil, the latter effect refers to drilling in greater depth which causes higher costs 
as well as lower well pressure (Lin & Wagner, 2007). This relates to the economically well-
accepted notion that “high grade, low cost, mineral deposits are mined first” (Marvasti, 2000). 
In contrast, technological change is a more complex term. Agreement exists on its potential 
for exploration costs reduction due to a higher success probability of drilling activities and a 
more accurate quantification of the targeted oil field. Since there are difficulties to specify 
technological change, Stoneman (1983) splits the evolutionary process any successful 
technology faces into the three stages of invention, innovation, and diffusion. First, a proto-
type model is developed for a new technology which is then commercialized and eventually 
adopted at large scale within the industry. Existing literature proposes measurement proxies 
such as R&D spending or patenting activity. Yet both suffer from inaccuracies, e.g. the 
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problem that innovations are sometimes difficult to attribute to specific petroleum sector 
R&D spending. Further, the success rate of exploratory activities may vary greatly. 
Nevertheless, Forbes and Zampelli (2000) found significant proof that over the last decades 
such endeavors have become more successful on average. Therefore, the application of actual 
diffusions, i.e. the number of successfully commercialized technological innovations would 
result in a more accurate number, since it excludes R&D failures (Cuddington & Moss, 2001). 
Even though the effects of reserve size and technological progress are well accepted in natural 
resource economics, they do not yield an entirely realistic picture of unit extraction costs. 
Thus, recent research questions the standard model in arguing that characteristics of the 
resource stock may not be neglected as an influential determinant of extraction costs. 
Marvasti (2000) proposes that specific attention should be paid to geological features of oil 
reserves, e.g. its composition and depth underneath the earth crust. The validity of this 
argumentation becomes obvious by comparing the accessibility and, similarly, cost of 
exploitation of oil reserves in the arctic region around Spitzbergen (i.e., offshore) with the 
ones on the Saudi Arabian peninsula. Resource quality can be neglected here, since the 
various lead commodities West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Brent, Dubai, and Maya roughly 
follow a long-run equilibrium price path, even though they differ in terms of viscosity and 
sulphur content (Hammoudeh et al., 2008). Reserve characteristics have not played a major 
role in theory so far, but their cost implications are unquestioned in reality and may reveal 
increasing competitive advantages, if the easily accessible resource stocks decline further. 
Consequently, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran or Kuwait have the potential to exploit 
their cost advantages in order to strengthen their market positions in the future (Birol & 
Davie, 2001). In order to understand OPEC’s degree of influence on the oil price, it is crucial 
to shed light on the key price factors as well. 
3  Analysis of crude oil price determinants 
Despite a sharp decline recently, the oil price has steadily increased on average over the last 
28 years (see Appendix 1). Numerous influencing factors occur on a geological, economic, 
financial, and political level. In addition, worldwide supply and demand, i.e. the fundamental 
driving forces, have an enormous impact on the oil price. In general, demand for oil is driven 
both by population growth and increasing per capita consumption as a consequence of 
economic growth and increases in welfare foremost among emerging countries. Representative 
examples from the last decade are China and India which mainly accounted for the 
temporarily skyrocketing market price in 2008 (Matutinovic, 2009). Even though the last 
financial crisis slowed down global economic development, it is undoubted that developing 
countries will continue their quest for closing the welfare gap to the developed world. Hence, 
oil demand is likely to increase further over the upcoming decades. 
In contrast, the supply side is more multifaceted. One needs to distinguish between reserves 
on the one hand and the capacity to utilize the resource stock, i.e. the processes from extraction 
to selling the refined products on the market, on the other hand. Despite ample exploitation in 
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the past, from a geological perspective countries still own vast oil reserves, e.g. in addition to 
commercial reserves Canada’s tar sand comprises a greater net oil potential than Saudi 
Arabia’s stated conventional reserves (DiPeso, 2005). At current extraction rates, worldwide 
demand can be satisfied for decades, however at rising cost. Announcements of governments 
about their proven reserve size deserve special caution, since strategic behavior can be used to 
bias financial market opinions. For instance, understating the true amount today gives a 
government room for cooling down market price roars by declaring new exploitable reserves 
at strategically appropriate points in time. 
Cost differences in production are reflected in the three stages related to commercial oil 
supply. First, in the upstream segment the technological level of exploration and production 
activities is the key price determining factor (Möbert, 2007). Empirical figures show 
significant differences in the extraction cost per barrel ranging from US$4 in the Middle East 
and up to US$12 in other parts of the world (Birol & Davie, 2001). Second, the midstream 
segment is dominated by the availability of Very Large Crude Oil Carriers (VLCC). In the 
last years, new tonnage capacity could not keep pace with the sharp increase in worldwide 
demand for oil leading to strong price increases of shipping rates. Third, downstream 
activities such as cracking heavy oil into gasoline, heating oil, or other intermediate products 
depend on available refineries. Möbert (2007) concludes that there was a shortage in refining 
capacity in 2004 partially being responsible for an increase in the price of WTI oil in the 
following years. 
As a consequence of global access to state-of-the-art information technology, spot and future 
markets make actors’ behavior immediately visible and therefore the role of financial markets 
for the oil industry has increased dramatically over the past decade. On the one side trading on 
spot markets solves short-term supply and demand disequilibria, while on the other hand the 
exchange of specific certificates, e.g. forward contracts with a predefined volume, date, and 
price, reduces the risk exposure of up- and downstream producers in the future. Despite its 
growing influence on short-term changes of the oil price, financial activities cannot explain 
market price trends alone. Kauffmann and Ullman (2009) explain the oil price bubble in 2008 
as a consequence of an imbalance of fundamental values, namely an excess demand from China 
and India and constraints in supply capacities in oil exporting countries. The supply shortage 
already visible on the futures market was eventually translated into the spot market and led to 
rising prices. Since traders recognized liquid energy certificates as investment alternatives, the 
price race was further accelerated. In general, they note that speculative elements underlying 
price trends first become visible on the futures market, since future contracts do not require a 
serious interest of taking actual delivery (Kauffmann and Ullman 2009). 
Though widely neglected, the exposure of the crude oil price to the US dollar exchange rate 
volatility is another major price determinant. Being the global invoicing currency, the 
comparative strength of the US dollar has a major impact on demand and, thus, on price 
developments. Empirically, a cointegrating relationship between the crude oil price and the 
Euro-US dollar exchange rate was empirically found (Zhang et al., 2008). As a consequence, 
changes in the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve System as well as the European 
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Central Bank have an indirect influence on the oil price. The magnitude of exchange rate 
volatility exposure for an individual country depends, first, on its demand for foreign oil 
supplies and, second, on its heterogeneighty of international trade activities. In total, spillover 
effects from the dollar exchange rate are limited, even though financial investors may 
capitalize on the linkage between the two markets in the short-term (Zhang et al., 2008). 
A less tangible concept is uncertainty about the future.  As it is the case for all tradable 
commodities, a higher risk demands a premium on the price. In the case of crude oil, there are 
various indicators which serve as proxies for a future outlook. First, the higher the ratio of 
investment spending of oil companies on maintenance and expansion of production in 
comparison to exploration activities, the more secure is short-term supply. This certainly 
yields a simplified picture, yet it may serve as a broad trend. Further, the declaration of new 
proven reserves is to increase supply security among market participants and, hence, calms 
down any upward price race. Nevertheless, since the greatest reserves are in few hands of 
mostly autocratically governed countries, oil reserves may be misused as an instrument in a 
highly political game of international power (see Appendix 2). Consequently, trusting solely 
the amount of proven reserves is not sufficient for an assessment of supply uncertainty. To 
give a final example, experts can only vaguely predict economic growth. As the recent 
financial crisis shows, unforeseeable events distort stable long-term development paths and 
have a significant impact on the spot market price. In the light of shrinking basic natural 
resource stocks such as fertile land and freshwater economists have no doubt that soon violent 
conflicts will occur between population groups who do not fight for cheap energy, but for 
survival. Even though most western civilizations are unable to grasp or are ignorant to accept 
(or both), the limits to growth are becoming more and more visible in the developing regions 
in the world and will inevitably lead to conflicts influencing markets worldwide. 
Another important price determinant is the political environment of oil, which is currently 
undergoing a dramatic transition. In the 80s and 90s, supply could easily satisfy demand and 
prices were relatively stable. Oil exporting countries provided fairly stable extraction rates 
and the amount of proven reserves increased constantly. The turn of the century made the new 
era of the global political economy visible, as there are two major trends, which have the 
potential to dominate the oil price in the future and being discussed on the political agenda of 
oil importing nations. One concept is resource pragmatism which refers to the strategy of oil 
exporting countries to satisfy their domestic demand first before considering third parties. 
Even though the transformation of mineral wealth into financial wealth at an earlier point in 
time may promise significant profits, governments are wise enough not to trade short-term 
financial gain against future physical supply to inland firms and households with oil and 
intermediary products (Matutinovic, 2009). The other concept is resource nationalism which 
emphasizes the fact that most oil reserves are in the hands of national oil companies. This 
linkage often translates political objectives into the country’s resource strategy. As could be 
witnessed in Winter 2007-08, Russia exploited its European market power over natural gas to 
charge extraordinary transmission fees to Ukraine in order to demonstrate its leading political 
role in Europe. The risk prevails that other oil exporting countries, especially under autocratic 
governments such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, enter a similar path of striving for regional 
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predominance. A closer look at the current distribution of proven oil reserves confirms this 
statement (see Appendix 2). 
The development of substitutes for oil products is a further price determining factor, however 
it can cause ambivalent effects. If alternative sources for energy and fuel production continue 
to grow, the dependence on oil declines. This intuitively relaxes the market price, which, in 
turn, bears incentives to increase oil demand at the same time. Ample evidence can be seen in 
the heavy investments of Europe, the US, China, and Japan into energy generation from 
renewable resources including solar, wind, and geothermal power. In terms of fuel and 
gasoline, agricultural land is transformed into sugar cane plantations in Brazil, whereas 
Malaysia and Indonesia evolve to become the major palm oil producers in the world. These 
countries clearly accepted the tradeoff between preserving valuable natural resources, here 
primary rain forests including an unmatched level of biodiversity, and short-term economic 
incentives. 
In addition to all other factors, OPEC serves as another influencing variable on the oil price. 
Its two goals of sufficient supply and stable prices are to be achieved by a quota system which 
allows each member an annual production in relation to its proven reserves. Regulating the 
individual quotas can impact the world market price. Successful applications of the system 
could be seen during the oil price shocks in the 1970s. Interestingly, OPEC appeared unable 
to prevent the 2008 price race, even though it increased its production quotas to the highest 
levels in history. 
4  Discussion and conclusion 
Summarizing, empirical data shows that there are two major factors which drive the oil price 
in the long-run: first, global demand, which increases due to constant population growth and 
increasing per capita consumption primarily in emerging countries; second, future supply, 
which is highly uncertain to remain stable, since oil exporting countries manage their oil 
reserves more and more independently from the needs of third parties.  
Now, the following three fundamental arguments will make clear why the world market price 
of oil can never fall below the extraction cost of the marginal oil producer. First, oil is traded 
on an imperfectly competitive market. The number of oil providers is limited and OPEC’s 
cartel-like structure represents a large share of the oil market. Second, a rational investor 
claims a resource rent which exceeds the comparable interest rate as a premium for risky 
exploitation of oil. If a natural resource is not able to yield this excess return, the investor 
would transfer the funds to a less risky business opportunity. Hotelling’s rule still holds, 
although its narrow argumentation is expanded by various other influencing factors outlined 
in Chapter 2. Third, oil is a nonrenewable resource with a backstop technology, i.e. at a 
certain price other technologies become economical, although profits have not turned negative. 
This can already be seen in the development of renewable energies such as wind, solar, and 
geothermal power, and the increasing usage of biofuels. 
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In total, OPEC’s market power contributes only marginally to the gap between the oil price 
and the extraction cost. On the one hand, the costs per barrel of oil are fairly independent of 
OPEC, since they are driven by technological progress and characteristics of the resource 
stock. On the other hand, the oil price may be indirectly influenced by OPEC, since its 
existence leads to an imperfectly competitive market. Even in the absence of the group, other 
drivers might rather serve as a guarantee for persistent profits for the marginal oil producer. A 
far more dominant impact on the oil price originates from resource pragmatism and 
nationalism which cause severe uncertainty of supply. It is unquestioned that sovereign 
nations who possess the largest oil reserves will strategically exploit them, since there is no 
rationale for them to respond to the needs of oil importing countries and establish a low price 
level per se. Thus, OPEC can be simply characterized as a group of countries serving as a 
vehicle or lever to augment the interests of its member states. However, the individual market 
power of countries such as Saudi Arabia might likely lead to a breakdown of the cartel-like 
structure and end up in independent activities. There is ample proof that member states 
already deviate from the agreed production quotas (Dibooglu & AlGudhea, 2007) which 
signals the growing instability of the group. Concluding, OPEC is a dominant player on the 
world’s oil market, but fails to be the guarantee for extraction costs of the marginal oil 
producer to stay below the crude oil price for reasons more sensitive and central than its 
present market power. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1:  Monthly average values for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil spot 
prices, in USD/barrel 
 
Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov (Dec 27, 2014) 
 
Appendix 2:  Countries with proven oil reserves of more than 25 billion of barrels in 
2012 
 
Source: Own graphic, based on http://www.eia.gov (Dec 27, 2014) 
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